The nature of knowledge, Fake News, and social media

Today, I’m enjoying listening to one of the latest courses promoted on “The Great Courses Plus” – specifically,
Theories of Knowledge: How to Think about What You Know. It is a refreshing review of my philosophy courses in Epistemology. I am currently passively absorbing the lectures from this course as I research the topic. A really good quote I encountered is here in an opinion piece from The New York Times – “How to Fix Fake News“:

“Technology spawned the problem of fake news, and it’s tempting to think that technology can solve it, that we only need to find the right algorithm and code the problem away. But this approach ignores valuable lessons from epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with how we acquire knowledge.”

The article is a simple read – with a simple solution – one that calls to mind how eBay customers rate eBay sellers. The author proposes a “reliability marker” – a score that she points out is already being used by Facebook behind the scenes in their efforts to clean up “Fake News” – yet, she puts it this way –

People could choose to use social media the same way they do today, but now they’d have a choice whenever they encounter new information. They might glance at the reliability marker before nodding along with a friend’s provocative post, and they might think twice before passing on a weird story from a friend with a red reliability marker. Most important of all, a green reliability marker could become a valuable resource, something to put on the line only in extraordinary cases — just like a real-life reputation.

There’s technology behind this idea, but it’s technology that already exists. It’s aimed at assisting rather than algorithmically replacing the testimonial norms that have been regulating our information-gathering since long before social media came along. In the end, the solution for fake news won’t be just clever programming: it will also involve each of us taking up our responsibilities as digital citizens and putting our epistemic reputations on the line.

Who can argue with that?